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ABSTRACT 
 
This research focuses on enhancing the understanding of the use of “rainy day funds” to deal with 
municipal fiscal shortfalls.  It is a pilot study, examining the largest 15 cities in West Virginia. Analysis of 
data from state reports and interviews with finance directors are used to determine whether, how, and to 
the degree the cities studied use various reserve fund mechanisms. While almost every city was found to 
have fiscal reserves, there was great variation in the methods used and amounts in how it was done – 




Fiscal stress is a recurring phenomenon in municipal governments. Due to balanced budget requirements, 
cities generally respond to this stress through a combination of spending cuts, one-time financing, debt 
issuance, fees and excise tax increases, broad-based tax increases, and use of “rainy day funds.” This 
research focuses on enhancing the understanding of the use of rainy day funds to deal with municipal 
fiscal shortfalls.  The objective of this research is to determine to what degree rainy day fund policies and 
institutional characteristics related to the effectiveness of these policies make a difference in the financial 
operations at a local level. This will provide insight into the budget processes and tax and revenue policy. 
 
However, it should be noted that this is a pilot study, examining a small group of cities in West Virginia. 
It examines the monies set aside for contingencies and the procedures for allocating such funds used by 
these cities. Information learned from this preliminary report will be used to fashion a larger study to 
examine a larger and more diverse group of cities and their rainy day fund policies. 
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 This is a wide-open area for exploration. There is limited existing research on the use of rainy day funds 
in local governments. There have only been a handful of notable articles and papers examining the 
subject.
1 Hence, the focus on localities in this paper is an attempt to add to the scant literature on rainy 
day funds at the local level. Meanwhile, there is a wide-ranging literature on the outcome of state rainy 
day fund policies.
2 However, even in those state level studies, institutional performance of these policies 
received scant attention.  
To gain initial insights into the operation of rainy day funds at the municipal level, this study used a two-
step approach. Budget data and descriptive variables for the 15 largest cities in West Virginia were 
examined for the eight-year period from FY1999 to FY2006. This was done to determine what affect 
economic, demographic, and environmental situations had on the reported use of rainy day funds by city 
governments. To augment this information, semi-structured interviews were conducted with municipal 
finance directors. They were asked questions regarding the use and administration of rainy day funds in 
their cities.  
 
This paper opens with an assessment of the fiscal environment facing West Virginia municipalities. It 
then briefly reviews the relevant existing literature regarding rainy day fund utilization. Next, the paper 
discusses the two-step research methodology. After that, the paper reports on the data analysis and the 
responses from the clarifying interviews. The paper then concludes with a discussion of the overall 
                                                           
1 Michael J. Wolkoff (1987) “An Evaluation of Municipal Rainy Day Funds” Public Budgeting & Finance 7(2): 52–63; Kenneth 
A. Kriz (2002) “The Optimal Level of Local Government Fund Balances: A Simulation Approach.” National Tax Association 
Proceedings, 95
th Annual Conference on Taxation; Justin Marlowe (2005) “Fiscal Slack and Counter-Cyclical Expenditure 
Stabilization: A First Look at the Local Level,” Public Budgeting & Finance, 25(3): 48-72; Rebecca Hendrick (2006) “The Role 
of Slack in Local Government Finances,” Public Budgeting & Finance, 26(1): 14-46. 
 
2 Richard L. Pollock and Jack P. Suyderhound (1986) “The Role of Rainy Day Funds in Establishing Fiscal Stability,” National 
Tax Journal 39(4): 485-497; Russell S. Sobel and Randall G. Holcombe (1996) “The Impact of State Rainy Day Funds in Easing 
State Fiscal Crises During the 1990-1991 Recession,” Public Budgeting & Finance, 16(3): 28-48; James W. Douglas and Ronald 
Keith Gaddie (2002) “State Rainy Day Funds and Fiscal Crises: Rainy Day Funds and the 1990-1991 Recession Revisited,” 
Public Budgeting & Finance, 22(1): 19-30; Yilin Hou (2003) “What Stabilizes State General Fund Expenditures in Downturn 
Years – Budget Generalization Fund or General Fund Unreserved Undesignated Balance,” Public Budgeting & Finance, 23(3): 
64-91;  Yilin Hou (2004) “Budget Stabilization Fund: Structural Features of the Enabling Legislation and Balance Levels,” 
Public Budgeting & Finance, 24(3): 38-64. 
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 findings with respect to municipal utilization of rainy day funds, their meanings, and the next steps in this 
research program.  
 
 
MOUNTAIN STATE SETTING 
 
West Virginia is ideal for this exploratory research for several reasons.  First and foremost, the data are 
available. Cities are required to submit their budgets to the state for approval more than three months 
prior to the beginning of the fiscal year. The General Fund budgets include a designated line items for 
Contingencies (Chart of Accounts Number 699) as well as places where such funds could be placed. Also, 
the state created what would appear to be a natural rainy day fund mechanism for cities in the Municipal 
Stabilization Fund Act in 2001 (State Code §8-37, see the Appendix I for full text).  
 
In addition, the state had two Class I cities (population of 50,000 or more in the most recent census) and 
13 Class II cities (population of 10,000 but less than 50,000 in the most recent census) at the beginning of 
the time period covered in the study. No city had a population of more than 60,000 (see Table 1). At the 
start of the study, the estimated population for the cities examined ranged between 9,900 and 55,400; at 
the end of the study, the estimated population for the cities ranged between 9,500 and 51,200. This 
provided cities that were large enough to require a certain level administrative expertise and that common 
functional activities (i.e., mayor, council, police, fire, streets, etc.) but at the same time that would be 
expected to be fairly straightforward in their operations.
3  
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
                                                           
3 Michael John Dougherty, Kenneth A. Klase, and Soo Geun Song (1999) The Needs and Financial Problems of Small and Rural 
Localities: The Case of West Virginia. Public Budgeting & Finance, 19(3): 16-30. 
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 More germane to a discussion regarding rainy day funds though, is the long-held notion that West 
Virginia’s municipalities are under constant financial distress due to demographic changes, state fiscal 
problems, and structural problems in municipal financing.
4  The analysis below demonstrates the 
difficulty of revenue generation for the general fund, experienced in recent years in West Virginia 
municipalities. In some ways, the revenue situation also seems to be related to the municipality size. As 
such, the role of population in municipal revenues is also discussed in this section. 
 
General Fund Revenues Patterns 
 
Over the eight-year period that this study covers, general fund revenues for the 15 cities studies increased 
in nominal terms by at least 10 percent (Table 2). The combined revenue increase was 31.8 percent – or 
just over 5 percent per year. Eight cities had increases that exceeded the average, including three that saw 
a 50 percent jump in their general funds. Adjusting this for inflation, the story is a bit different. Four cities 
actually saw revenue decreases in real terms over the period (Table 3). Overall, the increase was just over 
12 percent for all cities – or roughly 2 percent per year. Eight cities had increases that exceeded the 
average, but only two experienced a 25 percent or more revenue increase.  
 
Historically, the three largest revenue sources for West Virginia municipalities are the business and 
occupation (B&O) tax (a gross receipts tax imposed on businesses located within city limits), the property 
tax, and fees.
5 All had patterns that roughly mirrored the overall revenue picture – though not all cities 
experienced increases in each revenue source. 
                                                           
4 James H. Thompson and Woo S. Kee (1967)  The Municipal Revenue Problem in West Virginia, Bureau of Business Research, 
West Virginia University, West Virginia University Press, Morgantown, W.Va.;  William S. Reece (1994)  “Local Government 
Finance and Its Implications for Economic Development,” in West Virginia in the 1990s, Robert Jay Dilger and Thomas Stuart 
Witt, eds. West Virginia University Press, Morgantown, W.Va.; Kenneth A. Klase (1994) “Meeting Fiscal Challenges in the 
1990s: Local Government Fiscal Trends in West Virginia,” West Virginia Public Affairs Reporter, 11(2); L. Christopher Plein 
and David G. Williams. (1996). “Local Government Finance in West Virginia,” West Virginia Public Affairs Reporter, 13 (3); 
Mehmet S. Tosun (2003) Municipal Financing in West Virginia: Forging a Course for Fiscal Stability. West Virginia Public 
Finance Program Policy Report (August). 
 
5 Reece (1994). 
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The receipts for the business and occupational tax increased in nominal terms in all but one of the cities 
studied. The total increase for all the cities studied over the time period was 28.3 percent – or just over 4½ 
percent per year (Table 2). Only six cities had increases greater than the average, but three of those cities 
had gains of at least 70 percent, which somewhat skews the average increase. Adjusting for inflation, the 
increase is a modest 9.2 percent – less than 2 percent per year (Table 3). A total of 12 cities had increases 
in real terms, but only six of them experienced above average tax gains. Again, the three large increases 
skewed the overall results. One city almost saw its B&O taxes double in real terms while two others saw 
increases close to or exceeding 50 percent. 
 
Meanwhile property tax revenue exhibited more variation. In nominal terms, nine cities saw increased 
property tax revenue (meaning that even before adjusting for inflation, six cities had less property tax 
revenues come in for FY2006 than for FY1999). Overall, property tax revenue was down by about 2 
percent during the period studied (Table 2). This should not be surprising as West Virginia has had a 
property tax rate limitation since 1932 and property tax increase limits since the 1980s. But there was 
great variability as nine cities had their revenues from property taxes increase by at least 25 percent, 
including one city that experienced over an 80 percent jump in such monies and two others that saw 
increases close to or exceeding 50 percent. In real terms, only seven cities had inflation adjusted increases 
in property taxes collected while combined revenues fell by almost 17 percent (Table 3). This occurred 
despite one city seeing over a 50 percent in its property tax revenues in real terms over the period.  
 
The use of fees varied among the cities studied. One city did not report any revenue in the category while 
another city indicated it collected more in fees than in either B&O taxes or property taxes in FY2006. 
Also in FY2006, four other cites stated they received more in fees than in property taxes but no other 
cities stated they collected more in fees than in B&O taxes. Fee revenues increase in all but one of the 
cities using that revenue source (13) during the study period (Table 2). The overall increase was 29.4 
  5 
 percent – almost 5 percent per year and greater than the overall increase for either B&O taxes or property 
taxes (Table 2). However, only five cities had increases that exceeded the average, including two that saw 
increases of over 70 percent in their fees revenues. Thus, the increase appears to be driven by just a few 
cities raising fee rates and utilization.  This conclusion is strengthened when fees revenues are adjusted 
for inflation as less than half the cities (6 of 14) reported increases in real terms but the overall combined 
increase in real revenue was over 10 percent (Table 3).  
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The Role of Population in Municipal Revenues 
 
Population is another crucial important factor in municipal financing.  It provides the tax base and 
justifies the provision of public services.  Thus, strong relationship between population and municipal 
revenue would be expected. A historical study highlighted this in the context of West Virginia local 
governments and showed that population loss affects county and school finances.
6  However, he has not 
confirmed this for a small sample of cities included in his study.  
 
West Virginia is known to have a low population density due to its rural landscape.  It has had very low 
population growth rates in recent decades with periods of actual population losses.  Only two of the 
state’s 15 largest cities had population increases between 1990 and 2000; the other 13 lost anywhere from 
1 to 3,866 people. Greater competitive pressures faced by larger municipalities of the state can partially 
explain this situation. This group of larger cities also experienced population loss at a rate higher than all 
municipalities in the state. Overall, roughly three-quarters of all cities and towns had fewer residents in 
2000 than they did one decade before. The population loss trend appears to have continued throughout the 
                                                           
6 John L. Mikesell (1972) The Impact of Population Loss on Local Government Finances in West Virginia, Regional Research 
Institute, West Virginia University, Morgantown, W.Va.  
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 years covered by the study, given that the census estimates show only two of the largest cities in the state 
gaining population. 
 
Furthermore, the 2002 Census of Governments shows that the two municipalities with the largest 
populations (population 50,000 to 74,999) had greater total revenue per capita, tax revenue per capita, and 
intergovernmental revenue per capita than municipalities in all other population classes (Table 4). 
Revenue from the federal government was particularly high for these municipalities compared to 
municipalities in other population classes.  Meanwhile, the next three largest municipalities (population 
25,000 to 49,999) had the lowest total revenue and general revenue per capita than any other group of 
municipalities. This marked a drastic decline from five years earlier when that group of cities had the 
highest per capita revenues (Table 5). The decline appears to be a result of a large reduction in the amount 
of charges and other miscellaneous revenues received.  
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Overall, the two largest municipalities reported a 17.2 percent increase in revenue and the third largest 
grouping of cities (nine cities with a population 10,000 to 24,999) reported a 16.3 percent increase in 
revenue. However, adjusting for inflation, the increases become 4.7 percent and 3.8 percent respectively.  
All cities and towns in the state showed a 6.1 percent revenue increase, but this was actually a 5.3 percent 
decrease when inflation was considered. This appears to be a product of the large revenue decline 
reported by the three municipalities in the second-largest population group (a 55.7 percent drop in 
nominal terms and a 60.5 percent drop in real terms). 
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Finally, a recent study compared West Virginia municipal finances with the municipalities of the 
Appalachian states by looking at the revenue structures of those municipalities that are grouped into eight 
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 population-size classes using the 1997 Census of Government data.
7 It found that West Virginia is the 
only state that lacks municipalities with population greater than or equal to 75,000.  West Virginia 
municipalities with larger populations seem to have had a greater revenue-generating capability compared 
to municipalities with smaller population sizes.   
 
At the same time, West Virginia municipalities are below the Appalachian states’ average in both total 
and general revenue per capita in all population-size classes except the “25,000 to 49,999” class – and the 
marked drop reported in revenue for that class of city in the 2002 Census of Government data would 
eliminate that positive indicator. In terms of tax revenue per capita, only the West Virginia municipalities 
in the “50,000 to 74,999” class rank above the average for the Appalachian states.  West Virginia 
municipalities, as a whole, have lower revenue per capita than both the average of all municipalities in 
Appalachian states and the average of all municipalities in the United States. 
 
PREVIOUS RAINY DAY FUND STUDIES 
 
Rainy day funds play an important role in the financial operations of the states. Most importantly, rainy 
day funds provide a means of responding to fiscal stress without causing many of the adverse economic 
affects brought about by tax increases, cuts, and borrowing. These adverse affects include: 
•  Instability and uncertainty: These effects result from tax increases and cuts, due to the fluctuations 
they create in tax payer burden and receipt of services. 
•  Increase borrowing costs and intergenerational equity issues: These effects arise because borrowing 
often pushes burdens onto future generations, and may adversely affect credit ratings. 
 
                                                           
7 Tosun (2003).  
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 There is a wide-ranging literature on state rainy day funds. This literature may be categorized into three 
research areas. The first research area include studies that have explored the extent to which governments 
puts away enough rainy day funds to alleviate the effect of economic downturns. These studies have 
repeatedly found that government rainy day funds tend to be significantly underfunded.
8
 
Bond rating agencies recommends governments to have rainy day funds amounting to 15 percent of 
annual general expenditures. An Urban Institute Study reports that 18 percent rainy day fund needed to 
come through a three-year fiscal crisis similar to early 1990s. Despite this, the majority of Governments 
have rainy day funds that fall below 5 percent of annual general expenditures. .
                                                          
   Adding to the severity of 
the funding gap is the fact that most of the funds fail to reflect the volatility characteristics of the 
individual states expenditure and revenue structure. Many of the more “stable” states have been reported 
to have large size rainy day funds, while more volatile have very limited funds set aside.
9  
 
The second area of research has focused on the role of rainy day fund practices and polices in assuring 
that these funds are used in the most effective manner.
10 Research has found that the contribution of rainy 
day funds is being significantly compromised by number of rainy day policies set in place by state 
agencies. These policies include: 
 
 
8 Iris J. Lav and Alan Berube (1999) When It Rains, It Pours. Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Washington, D.C. (March); 
Bob Zahradnik and Rose Ribeiro. (2003). Heavy Weather: Are State Rainy Day Funds Working? Center on Budget and Policy 
Priorities, Washington, D.C. (May 13). [www.cbpp.org/5-12-03sfp.htm]; E. Matthew Quigley (2003) “Preparing for the Storm: 
Rainy Day Funds in New England,” New England Fiscal Facts, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, (Summer, No. 31). 
 
9 Philip G. Joyce (2001). “What’s So Magical About Five Percent? A Nationwide Look at Factors That Influence the Optimal 
Size of State Rainy Day Funds.” Public Budgeting & Finance 21(2): 62-87. 
 
10 Jon David Vache and Brad Williams (1987) “Optimal Governmental Budgeting Contingency Reserve Funds,” Public 
Budgeting & Finance 7 (1): 66-82; Zahradnik and Ribeiro (2003); Hou (2003); Hou (2004).  
 
 
  9 
 •  Fund cap policies: Caps that limit the size of rainy day funds that may be set aside. Currently most 
states report maximum rainy day funds in the 2 percent to 7 percent range.
11 This includes about two-




•  Replenishment policies: These policies require states to rebuild their rainy day funds within a specific 
time frame. Many of these require rebuilding even if economic conditions have not improved.
13 
 
•  Restrictions on use: Many states have restrictions on how much you may use.
14 The rationale is often 
motivated by possible adverse affects the use may have on bond ratings.
15  
 
•  Deposit policies: Often rainy day fund considerations are not part of regular appropriations. The 
common contribution procedure is to make a deposit based on portion of year-end surplus, long after 
spending or tax cut decision are made, resulting in rainy day funds being treated as “leftovers.”
16 
 
The final area of research on rainy day funds has been centered on determining the contribution of these 
funds. Specifically, they have explored the extent to which rainy day funds alleviate fiscal stress, finding 
that fund structure impacts their utilization,
17 though the works have offered different perspectives as to 
whether the difference is directed by internal factors
18 or dependent upon external factors.
19  
                                                           
11 Hou (2004). 
 
12 Zahradnik and Ribeiro (2003). 
 
13 Zahradnik and Ribeiro (2003); Hou (2004). 
 
14 Vache and Williams (1987).  
 
15 Zahradnik and Ribeiro, (2003). 
 
16 Hou (2004). 
 
17 Sobel and Holcombe (1996); Douglas and Gaddie (2002); Hou (2003); Hou (2004). 
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A major limitation in the literature on rainy day funds is that it has almost exclusively been centered on 
states. As part of the literature review conducted for this paper, very few studies were found at the local 
level. A study from almost two decades ago examines the need for rainy day funds at the local level.
20 It 
reported that these might be of particular importance for localities because economic changes tend to 
impact localities particularly hard. At the time of the study of large cities two decades ago, only a handful 
had rainy day funds in place. The municipal rainy day funds that existed at that time ranged in size 
between 4 percent and 8 percent of the budget.  
 
More recent work has examined reserve funds at the local level. An initial piece over a decade ago found 
the use of reserve funds within the main budget rather than in separate funds to be quite common.
21 More 
recent studies have examined how large that reserve should be and what other uses it could have. An 
examination of Minnesota localities found that a 30 percent cash reserve balance was necessary to 
provide fiscal security, rather than the 5 percent rule of thumb commonly applied in the state.
22 Similarly, 
another report on Minnesota localities found that fiscal slack could be used for counter-cyclical purposes, 
but was limited in its effectiveness by the 5 percent cap on reserve funds.
23 Most recently, a study of 
suburban Chicago municipalities made the connection between fiscal health and organization 
administration. It also offered a model on how localities operate their reserve funds:  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
18 Sobel and Holcombe (1996). 
 
19 Douglas and Gaddie (2002). 
 
20 Wolkoff (1987). 
 
21 Charlie B. Tyer (1993) “Local Government Reserve Funds: Policy Alteratives and Political Strategies.” Public Budgeting & Finance. 
13(2): 75-84. 
 
22 Kriz (2002). 
 
23 Marlowe (2005). 
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 Consistent with organization theory, this analysis shows that slack resources are an 
important factor in how governments respond to their external and internal environments, 
and that these resources affect governments’ current fiscal condition and budgetary 
changes. These municipalities accumulate more reserves when faced with some risk or 





Two distinctly different methodological approaches were taken for this preliminary study on the use of 
rainy day funds in municipalities.  The first approach was quantitative, examining budgetary data for the 
eight-year period of FY1999 to FY2006. The second approach was qualitative, asking city finance 
directors about the use of rainy day funds in their communities.  
 
This dual approach was used for several reasons. First of all, as this is exploratory research with very little 
in the way of previous studies, it was not clear whether and to what degree meaningful differences in the 
use of rainy day funds would exist. Thus, by exploring both the budget calculus and the budgetary 
rationale behind these funds, a more complete picture could be created to direct future research. Related 
to this, since there were several different ways for cities to create rainy day funds in their budgets, it was 
not known whether or not a there would be the expected findings if only the budgetary data were to be 
examined Third, studying the budgetary data provides a “check” against cases where cities reported to 
have a rainy day fund but in reality had not established such an account. 
 
Even among this small group of cities there are some differences in population and professional 
wherewithal. Thus, two straightforward hypotheses were designed to test what difference – if any – 
structural elements had on the utilization of rainy day funds. Budgetary size and local population were the 
                                                           
24 Hendrick (2006): 42. 
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 independent variables in the hypotheses. The measured resources available provided a proxy for service 
needs. That led to a pair of hypotheses to be explored, respectively. The hypotheses put forth were: 
 
   ● Hypothesis One (H1): Cities with more people would make greater use of rainy day funds.  
  ● Hypothesis Two (H2): Cities with larger budgets would make greater use of rainy day funds. 
 
In the quantitative part of the analysis, the proportion of the total municipal general revenue placed into a 
contingency “fund” is examined.  This revenue analysis is based mainly on budget data from the West 
Virginia State Auditor’s Office. This showed to what degree finance directors were preparing for the 
future by setting aside monies in the General Fund to prepare for a “rainy day.” 
 
The qualitative portion of the research involved semi-structured interviews with finance directors of the 
cities studied. Interviews were conducted with officials from all 15 cities in late 2004 through early 2005, 
though in two cases officials were not able to provide detailed information. The interviews opened by 
asking the finance directors whether their cities used a rainy day fund. From that opening, they were 
asked how they implemented their rainy day fund policies and where they placed those funds in the 
budget. They were also asked specifically regarding the use of the Contingency line item (Chart of 
Accounts 699), capital reserve funds, and the Municipal Stabilization Fund as rainy day fund mechanisms 




There is considerable variation in contingencies as a share of total municipal general revenue (Table 6).  
The most striking feature though it the rather small amount allocated to contingencies. Only one city ever 
allocated the state maximum of 3 percent of its budget into the Contingencies Line Item. Only six cities 
ever set aside even 1 percent of their budgets in any one of the eight fiscal years studied. Only 
  13 
 Morgantown and Vienna began every fiscal year in the period with at least 1 percent of their budgets 
allocated for contingencies. This low level of contingency funds is surprising, especially given the 5 
percent standard for rainy day funds at the state level.
25  
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
 
An interesting pattern emerged over time. More cities put money into the Contingency Line Item and 
cities put more money into the contingency line item during the most recent economic downturn. The 
mean and median for the amount of the budget placed in contingencies was highest in FY2001. 
Meanwhile, the number of cities placing money in contingencies peaked in FY2002. This demonstrates 




Among the 15 cities, Morgantown and Vienna consistently had some of the highest amounts placed in the 
Contingency Line Item. Morgantown budgeted the maximum 3 percent amount three times in eight years 
and had the largest amount set aside on two other occasions as well. Meanwhile, Vienna was the only city 
that placed at least 2 percent of its budget in contingencies in each year examined. Both cities experienced 
major increases in revenue during the study period. Thus, they may have had the wherewithal necessary 
to support the creation of a rainy day fund. 
 
Another city that has had a high share of contingencies is Weirton. This allocation went from almost zero 
in the first three years of the study period to exceeding 2 percent of the budget in the last four. This is an 
interesting case because the city has been suffering recently from a declining steel industry.  Thus, it may 
have had no other choice but to be prepared for the unexpected loss of revenues and did so through the 
                                                           
25 Joyce (2001). 
 
26  See Kriz (2002) and Marlowe  (2005). 
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 expansion of its rainy day fund. Both of these cases point support the proposition put forth recently that 
cities set aside more in reserve when faced with risk or when they have the resources to do so.
27
 
On the other hand, three of the smaller cities in the city, Moundsville, St. Albans and South Charleston 
did not report any money in the Contingency Line Item. These cities each lost population during the study 
period. They also had mixed budgetary trends with overall revenue gains in real terms but a reduction in 
at least one major revenue source. Interestingly among the state’s two largest cities, Charleston and 
Huntington, there was limited use of the line item. Both reported putting money there, but the amounts 
budgeted were very small levels compared to other cities. In both cases, these results may indicate that 
these cities have developed other means than direct allocation of monies for their “rainy day funds.”  
 
These similar outcomes among small and large cities in the study throw into question the proposed 
hypotheses stated earlier. Correlation analysis confirms that the hypotheses as they are stated do not in 
fact have much explanatory power (Table 7). While the relationships are positive, the correlation of 
determination shows that the differences in budget size explains only 15 percent and that difference in 
population size explains just under 25 percent of the variation in the amount allocated to the Contingency 
Line Item for FY1999. The strength of the relationships falls precipitously in FY2006 as they each 
explain less than 3 percent of the variation in contingency utilization.  
[INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The analysis in this section, while preliminary, point to a number of interesting factors that may be 
affecting reserve fund policies in West Virginia municipalities. These include structural revenue 
generation problems, population changes and size, state fiscal stress and industry concentration. 
 
 
                                                           
27 Hendrick (2006). 
  15 
 Interview Responses 
 
The interviews conducted with city finance officials demonstrated much more variation in the use of rainy 
day funds in West Virginia municipal governments than anticipated (see Appendix II for a list of 
questions). Contrary to the data results, all the cities appeared to have some type of rainy day fund. But 
the similarities virtually ended there. 
 
The most interesting finding is that few cities said they had a Municipal Stabilization Fund (MSF). This is 
surprising since on the surface, the MSF appears to be structured to be a municipal rainy day fund. Only 
one city – Clarksburg – reported having such a fund.  “We have an MSF fund,” said the Clarksburg 
Finance Director. “We put in as much as possible – up to 30 percent, which is maximum allowed by law.” 
The official added that they have no minimum acceptable balance for the city’s MSF. At the time of the 
interview, the fund was roughly 5 percent of the city’s budget.  
 
In some places though, other funds predominate. Though not an MSF according to the state statutes, these 
funds nevertheless serve the same purpose. “We also have a 15-year old fund that they are not using that 
could be called a ‘rainy day fund,’” said one city official; “It is left over from a bond financing scheme 15 
years ago (the Mortgage Bond Fund). We would only draw on it during times of high fiscal stress.”  
 
Along the same lines, another finance director said, “I have a Capital Reserve Fund. If it’s an unbudgeted 
item – I’m in the process of doing that right now – we need a new roof on the police department and city 
hall. Those items are funded out of the capital reserve.” It should be noted that this particular city strived 
to have at least $1 million in its reserve fund and because of that does not use the Contingency Line Item.  
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 Conversely, an official in another city talked about a future MSF-type fund. “We don’t have one yet. We 
would like to have one. Hopefully someday we will. You want to use an actual bank account – not just a 
line item. Hopefully one day we can get to that point.”  
 
Most cities used other mechanisms at their disposal for their rainy day fund.  At least one finance director 
was not even aware of that type of fund could be established under the law. And the presence of an MSF 
did not necessarily mean it was used as a rainy day fund. “That money – that’s our cash flow we want to 
have at the end of every month,” stated the finance director. “The city always has two payrolls and bills in 
the following month. We always want to have a month’s worth of money on hand and that’s what we 
have in our Municipal Stabilization Fund.”  
 
However, this is not to say that the cities do not prepare for the unexpected. Most of the cities that 
responded indicated they put money in a contingency line item. Many of these used the specific 
Contingency Line Item (699) specified in the state Chart of Accounts. “Formally, it’s referred to as 
contingency fund,” explained one finance director. “The entity appropriates money a part of the regular 
appropriation process. The monies are not treated any different than the regular cash mgmt activities. 
Hence, in practice they do not have a specific set of monies put away. Further, more because it is part of 
the regular budget process funds are not carried over to next fiscal year.”  
 
One city has something similar in a different place in the budget. It puts that type of monies in the Office 
of the Mayor’s line item in the Chart of Accounts (409). “In the Mayor’s budget, line item called 
‘Emergency Funds,’” said that finance director. “It’s not a different fund but it is money that can be used. 
… We don’t have anything like that (contingencies) in our budget.”  
 
How much is put into those line items is highly variable, however.  One finance director said it put 2 
percent of its gross revenues into the contingencies. Another said it tries to keep cash for between 12 and 
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 15 percent of expenditures. A third strove to maintain a balance of 30 percent of the general fund budget 
in the MSF. Two finance directors mentioned they followed state law when determining how much to put 
into their rainy day fund – but they each cited different figures. Most cities though appear to use more 
informal calculations to determine how much to set aside. “During the budget process we always try to 
put a certain amount of money in Contingency line item,” explained one finance director. “Experience (is 
how we make the determination).  We’re using the (amount) that we’ve used over the past several years. 
It seems to work out.”  
 
Other city officials made similar observations. One said: “Nine times out of 10, we allocate X amount 
year in Contingency (Line Item) – 2 percent of gross revenues.”  Another noted: “We don’t currently have 
a rainy day fund … but (council) does put some monies aside … into a Contingency Line Item.”  
 
It was best summarized by the finance director who said: “It’s an expenditure line item that is available.  
When we do our budget process every year, we start out with a figure. It’s a guess. If we need to reduce 
or increase, that’s the line item we balance out in.” And a third stated, “It’s based on year-to-year 
situational context. No formal policy. Rather it is decided by city council in the regular budget process.” 
 
But that does not mean it is always done. One city official remarked: “It’s based on circumstances. My 
understanding was that they only put monies away when they can afford it, but not under tight fiscal 
conditions. Hence, in years where they may really need the funds, it is likely that they have not put 
contingency funds aside.” 
 
Finance directors also reported using (or being able to use) a variety of other mechanisms to provide for 
“rainy day funds.” In some cities, capital reserve funds were available for large, unexpected projects. In 
one city, such funds were “really the only rainy day fund we have,” according to its finance director. In 
other cities, the rainy day funds are savings maintained in bank accounts and not part of the regular 
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 budgeting process. Finally, short-term borrowing, especially from other city funds, was mentioned as an 
option for raising emergency contingency funds. Responses from finance directors on this subject 
included the following. 
● “We don’t use the contingency line item. It [the reserve] is not reflected there.” 
● “We have money in capital reserve” 
● “We have a CD tucked away – not for everyday use” 
● “We build slack into the general fund”  
● “We have a cash reserve that sits in three different bank accounts and an investment pool” 
 
There was not even a common theme on how decisions regarding the use of rainy day funds. In most 
cases, city council or its budget committee would make the decision based upon the recommendations of 
the finance director. In some cases though, the finance director has been empowered to make those 
decisions unilaterally, so long as other city officials (such as the mayor) are kept informed.  
 
Finally, some places also reported that they replenish the funds during the year – or increase them to their 
legal limit (the general fund contingency line item cannot exceed 3 percent of the budget). Regardless of 
the placement of the “rainy day funds,” several finance directors indicated that funds are replenished or 
increased during the year. The additional funding is based upon guidelines in each locality, which might 
examine tax receipts or cash collections. In other words, if there are available resources, more money is 
allocated for contingencies during the fiscal year.  This should not be surprising, as previous research has 
shown that as during the budget revision process, local finance officials in West Virginia generally 
attempt to move unused funds into areas where they can be spent prior to the end of the fiscal year.
28  
 
                                                           
28  Because of this rebudgeting phenomenon, only the original budgeted amounts were examined as part of this research. See 
Kenneth A. Klase, Michael John and Soo Geun Song (2001) “Exploring Within-Year Budget Adjustments in Small to Medium-
Sized Cities in West Virginia,” Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting & Financial Management 13(2): 245-279 and Michael 
John Dougherty, Kenneth A. Klase and Soo Geun Song (2003). “Managerial Necessity and the Art of Creating Surpluses: The 
Budget Execution Process in West Virginia Cities,” Public Administration Review 63(4): 484-497. 
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 DISCUSSION 
 
The financial data shows that contingency monies are almost never funded in municipal budgets and 
sometimes not even funded at all. The comments of the finance officials present a different story as 
almost all report using some mechanism to create reserve resources in the budget. Together, these 
demonstrate the near total lack of consistency on how rainy day funds are handled at the municipal level 
in West Virginia.  
 
In reality, the “rainy day” funds are put into a variety of “Rainy Day Funds.”  Cities use a combination of 
the Contingency Line Item, the newly-permitted Municipal Stabilization Funds, previously-created capital 
reserve funds, or other places within the city budgetary structure such as specific departmental line items.  
This “creative” budgeting also makes it difficult to truly assess the utilization and impact of such funds in 
the state because the data is not reported in any consistent way to it to be tracked. For example, state 
reports do not include data on the Municipal Stabilization Fund or any other capital reserve funds. This 
could be found in financial reports, but without additional information from the city, it is doubtful that 
reviewing the reports would provide any additional insight. Upon review, it is evident that the analysis of 
the Contingency Line Item is a good starting point but certainly does not capture all sufficient that is 
occurring with respect to “rainy day” fund activity.  
 
Even with the data and informational limitations, one point is apparent. Some cities do follow the patterns 
of funding reserves in times of flush revenues (because they can) and in times of uncertainty (as a hedge) 
that was seen elsewhere.
29 Some cities even understand the counter-cyclical purpose of such reserve 
funds.
30 But this understanding and utilization is far from universal as some cities use vastly different 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
29 See Hendrick (2006).  
 
30 See Kriz (2002) and Marlowe (2005).  
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 approaches to prepare to accumulate reserve funds. Instead, it is in line with some previous findings 
which showed localities used any means available to accumulate reserve funds.
31
  
Given the wide variation, some might suggest that additional rules and regulation would lead to more 
consistent use of rainy day funds among West Virginia municipalities. However, it is doubtful that such 
an action would be highly effective in achieving its objectives. Existing regulations, such as the 
Municipal Stabilization Fund Act, have not led to standardization in rainy day fund operations.  
 
However, it is more likely that strict regulation would inhibit innovation. The different rainy day funds 
mechanisms currently in use demonstrate that municipal officials can find a wide range of solutions to the 
same problem. If all cities had to use the same process, this would be lost.  
 
Also, the background of the officials in charge of the budget administration may limit the effectiveness of 
any regulation. Many of the finance directors are not formally trained. Their lack of knowledge with 
respect to budgeting and financial management matters could result in new rules not being followed or 
not being followed properly. Also, there appears to be a fair degree of turnover in the position of finance 
director. These new finance directors probably are not as knowledgeable about the state laws regarding 
municipal finance. Thus, rules and regulations sometimes might not be followed out of ignorance. 
 
Taken together, these factors can lead to a situation that would make it more difficult for these officials to 
make the necessary and common connection between policy and theory.
32 Even with straightforward and 
detailed instructions from state officials, it would not be surprising if the implementation of any newly 
imposed uniform policy went awry because of misunderstandings, misstatements, or mistakes. 
 
                                                           
31 See Tyer (1993). 
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 These and other factors discussed above point to need for education to improve the capacity of finance 
directors. Training in general governmental operations is already available through the Local Government 
Leadership Academy offered through the Institute of Public Affairs of the West Virginia University 
Department of Political Science. However, this would involve more specialized course offerings. Such 
course(s) could be as added as electives to the existing curriculum for pubic officials and could employ 
other WVU units (such as the Division of Public Administration, the Extension Service, etc.) as well as 
other institutions of higher education around the state and professional organizations for public officials 
(in this case the West Virginia Municipal League).  
 
Of course, all of this points to the need for additional research on the subject. An extension of the 
quantitative portion of this research would involve using regression analysis to directly examining how 
factors such as structural revenue generation problems, population changes and size, state fiscal stress and 
industry concentration affect the rainy day fund. The qualitative portion of the research would be 
furthered by pointed questions asking about all types of rainy day fund mechanisms mentioned by finance 
directors. It also would be beneficial to gain input from other city administrative officials – most notably 
the city managers – regarding the use of rainy day funds in their communities.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
32 Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky. (1984). Implementation, 3
rd ed (expanded). University of California Press, 
Berkeley, Calif. 
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 APPENDIX I 
 
CHAPTER 8. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
ARTICLE 37. MUNICIPAL FINANCIAL STABILIZATION FUND ACT. 
 
§8-37-1. Short title. 
 
This act may be known and cited as the “Municipal Financial Stabilization Fund Act”. 
  
§8-37-2. Findings and declarations. 
 
The Legislature finds and declares that: 
 
 (1) Municipalities should maintain a prudent level of financial resources to try to protect against reducing 
service levels or raising taxes and fees because of temporary revenue shortfalls, unpredicted one-time 
expenditures or emergency situations; and 
 
 (2) The creation, maintenance and use of a financial stabilization fund will provide municipalities with 
assistance to meet these challenges, as well as enable them to improve their financial management and 
practices. 
 
§8-37-3. Budget stabilization fund; creation; appropriation; maximum. 
 
(a) A municipality may create a financial stabilization fund by a majority vote of its governing 
body. The fund may receive appropriations, gifts, grants and any other funds made available. 
 (b) The governing body may appropriate a sum to the fund from any surplus in the general fund 
at the end of each fiscal year or from any other money available. 
 (c) The amount of money in the fund may not exceed thirty percent of the municipality's most 
recent general fund budget, as originally adopted. When the fund exceeds the thirty percent, the 
governing body shall transfer the excess to any fund it considers appropriate. 
 
§8-37-4. Fund investment; usage. 
 
 (a) The governing body may invest the money in the fund as it considers appropriate, with the 
earnings retained by the fund. 
 (b) The governing body may appropriate money in the financial stabilization fund upon a 
majority vote for the following purposes: 
 (1) To cover a general fund shortfall; or 
 (2) Any other purpose the municipality considers appropriate 
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 APPENDIX II 
 
Finance Director Interview Questions 
 
1.  Do you use a General Fund (GF) Contingency line item? 
 
2.  How do you decide how much to put into GF Contingency? 
Mayor’s Policy? Council Policy? Departmental Policy? Rule of Thumb? 
 
3.  What rules do you have for using GF Contingency funds? 
What do you do if GF Contingency Funds not spent at end of fiscal year? 
What do you do if GF Contingency Funds overspent before end of fiscal year? 
 
4.  Do you have a minimum threshold for GF Contingency Funds? 
 
5.  Do you have a Municipal Financial Stabilization Fund (MSF)? 
 
6.  How do you decide how much to put into MSF? 
Mayor’s Policy? Council Policy? Departmental Policy? Rule of Thumb? 
 
7.  What rules do you have for using MSF? 
What do you do if MSF not spent at end of fiscal year? 
What do you do if MSF overspent before end of fiscal year? 
 
8.  Do you have any replenishment requirements for MSF? 
Mayor’s Policy? Council Policy? Departmental Policy? Rule of Thumb? 
 
9.  Do you have a minimum acceptable balance for MSF? 
 
10. Do you have a Capital Reserve Fund? Are those monies ever used for non-planned emergencies? If 
so, site examples or types 
 
11. Do you have any other rainy day fund (RDF) mechanisms? 
 
12. If so, how do they operate? What rules do you have for using? 
Mayor’s Policy? Council Policy? Departmental Policy? Rule of Thumb? 
 
13. Do you have any replenishment requirements for MSF?  
Do you have any minimum acceptable balance for MSF? 








 TABLE 1: The 15 Largest Cities in West Virginia 
City  1990 




 Census  
2005 







Beckley  18,274 19,345 17,254 16,936  NO  YES 
Bluefield  12,756 12,458 11,451 11,119 YES  NO
*
Charleston  57,287 55,304 53,421 51,176 YES  YES 
Clarksburg  17,970 17,487 16,743 16,439 YES  YES 
Fairmont  20,210 20,336 19,097 19,049 YES  YES 
Huntington  54,844 52,589 51,475 49,198 YES  YES 
Martinsburg  14,073 15,601 14,972 15,996 YES  YES 
Morgantown  25,879 29,181 26,809 28,292 YES  YES 
Moundsville  10,753 9,929 9,998 9,567  YES  NO 
Parkersburg  33,862 32,590 33,099 32,020  NO  YES 
St. Albans  12,241 11,992 11,567 11,105  NO  YES 
S. Charleston  13,645 14,332 13,390 12,700  NO  YES 
Vienna  10,862 11,304 10,861 10,770  NO  YES 
Weirton  22,124 21,263 20,411 19,544 YES  YES 
Wheeling  34,882 32,968 31,419 29,639 YES  YES 
SOURCES:  U.S. Census Bureau. W. Va. Municipal League 2003-2004 Municipal Directory.  
NOTE:   Bluefield normally has a Finance Director but the position was open during the study (2004).  



























Beckley   $11,093,997   $  6,250,000    $ 1,440,016    $             -      $12,729,995   $  7,937,000   $ 1,793,334    $            -     14.75% 26.99% 24.54%  N/A 
Bluefield   $  6,348,848    $  2,340,000    $    824,260    $  1,108,100   $  7,096,810   $  2,200,000   $    916,241    $    970,000  11.78%  -5.98% 11.16%  -12.46% 
Charleston   $48,355,305    $27,870,000    $ 5,911,003    $  2,150,000   $63,276,260   $32,500,000   $ 4,218,225    $ 4,606,000  30.86%  16.61%  -28.64% 114.23% 
Clarksburg   $  8,662,124    $  4,322,000    $ 1,279,539    $     894,060   $11,799,702   $  5,802,000   $ 1,639,611    $ 1,333,600  36.22%  34.24%  28.14% 49.16% 
Fairmont   $  7,538,744    $  2,750,000    $ 1,226,224    $     992,300   $  8,730,100   $  3,689,000   $ 1,410,937    $ 1,000,000  15.80%  34.15% 15.06%  0.78% 
Huntington   $26,580,192    $11,476,390    $ 4,365,853    $  4,515,000   $36,309,898   $13,400,000   $ 3,770,114    $ 6,388,000  36.61%  16.76%  -13.65% 41.48% 
Martinsburg   $  6,608,000    $  2,300,000    $    905,000    $     450,000   $10,000,000   $  5,200,000   $ 1,321,552    $    635,000  51.33%  126.09% 46.03% 41.11% 
Morgantown   $11,189,136    $  5,352,000    $ 1,624,814    $  1,662,000   $17,415,942   $  9,200,000   $ 2,512,255    $ 1,808,000  55.65%  71.90%  54.62% 8.78% 
Moundsville   $  4,217,724    $  1,350,000    $    369,164    $     375,600   $  5,318,095   $  1,600,000   $    499,479    $    669,400  26.09%  18.52% 35.30% 78.22% 
Parkersburg   $16,585,064    $  7,429,395    $ 3,063,602    $  2,325,000   $19,349,830   $  9,460,046   $ 2,983,633    $ 2,505,000  16.67%  27.33%  -2.61% 7.74% 
St. Albans   $  5,710,725    $  2,250,000    $ 1,090,699    $  1,390,000   $  8,642,248   $  2,800,000   $    992,918    $ 1,502,000  51.33%  24.44% -8.96%  8.06% 
S.Charleston   $12,272,075    $  6,000,000    $ 3,301,082    $     569,000   $16,408,006   $  7,406,822   $ 2,574,748    $    610,000  33.70%  23.45%  -22.00% 7.21% 
Vienna   $  3,646,763    $  1,662,000    $    717,248    $     310,000   $  5,076,081   $  2,325,000   $ 1,293,364    $    310,000  39.19%  39.89% 80.32%  0.00% 
Weirton   $10,636,680    $  1,650,000    $ 2,765,680    $  2,576,000   $14,542,904   $  3,000,000   $ 2,315,582    $ 3,150,000  36.72%  81.82%  -16.27% 22.28% 
Wheeling   $18,264,982    $  6,785,000    $ 2,795,282    $  2,015,000   $23,794,958   $  8,700,000   $ 2,709,731    $ 2,120,000  30.28%  28.22%  -3.06% 5.21% 
TOTAL  $197,710,359    $89,786,785    $31,679,466   $21,332,060  $260,490,829  $115,219,868   $30,951,724   $27,607,000  31.75%  28.33%  -2.30%  29.42% 
SOURCE:   West Virginia State Auditor, Chief Inspector Division, Fiscal Years 1999-2006.  
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Beckley   $11,093,997   $  6,250,000    $ 1,440,016    $             -      $10,828,362   $  6,751,355   $ 1,525,442    $             -     -2.39% 8.02% 5.93%  N/A 
Bluefield   $  6,348,848    $  2,340,000    $    824,260    $  1,108,100   $  6,036,674   $  1,871,359   $    779,371    $    825,099  -4.92%  -20.03% -5.45%  -25.54% 
Charleston   $48,355,305    $27,870,000    $ 5,911,003    $  2,150,000   $53,823,922   $27,645,083   $ 3,588,098    $ 3,917,946  11.31%  -0.81%  -39.30% 82.23% 
Clarksburg   $  8,662,124    $  4,322,000    $ 1,279,539    $     894,060   $10,037,038   $  4,935,285   $ 1,394,683    $ 1,134,384  15.87%  14.19%  9.00% 26.88% 
Fairmont   $  7,538,744    $  2,750,000    $ 1,226,224    $     992,300   $  7,425,980   $  3,137,930   $ 1,200,168    $    850,618  -1.50%  14.11% -2.12%  -14.28% 
Huntington   $26,580,192    $11,476,390    $ 4,365,853    $  4,515,000   $30,885,851   $11,398,280   $ 3,206,927    $ 5,433,747  16.20%  -0.68%  -26.55% 20.35% 
Martinsburg   $  6,608,000    $  2,300,000    $    905,000    $     450,000   $  8,506,179   $  4,423,213   $ 1,124,136    $    540,142  28.73%  92.31% 24.21% 20.03% 
Morgantown   $11,189,136    $  5,352,000    $ 1,624,814    $  1,662,000   $14,814,313   $  7,825,685   $ 2,136,969    $ 1,537,917  32.40%  46.22%  31.52% -7.47% 
Moundsville   $  4,217,724    $  1,350,000    $    369,164    $     375,600   $  4,523,667   $  1,360,989   $    424,866    $    569,404  7.25%  0.81% 15.09% 51.60% 
Parkersburg   $16,585,064    $  7,429,395    $ 3,063,602    $  2,325,000   $16,459,313   $  8,046,885   $ 2,537,932    $ 2,130,798  -0.76%  8.31%  -17.16% -8.35% 
St. Albans   $  5,710,725    $  2,250,000    $ 1,090,699    $  1,390,000   $  7,351,251   $  2,381,730   $    844,594    $ 1,277,628  28.73%  5.85%  -22.56% -8.08% 
S.Charleston   $12,272,075    $  6,000,000    $ 3,301,082    $     569,000   $13,956,944   $  6,300,376   $ 2,190,127    $    518,877  13.73%  5.01%  -33.65% -8.81% 
Vienna   $  3,646,763    $  1,662,000    $    717,248    $     310,000   $  4,317,806   $  1,977,687   $ 1,100,159    $    263,692  18.40%  18.99% 53.39%  -14.94% 
Weirton   $10,636,680    $  1,650,000    $ 2,765,680    $  2,576,000   $12,370,455   $  2,551,854   $ 1,969,676    $ 2,679,447  16.30%  54.66%  -28.78% 4.02% 
Wheeling   $18,264,982    $  6,785,000    $ 2,795,282    $  2,015,000   $20,240,418   $  7,400,376   $ 2,304,946    $ 1,803,310  10.82%  9.07%  -17.54% -10.51% 
TOTAL  $197,710,359    $89,786,785    $31,679,466   $21,332,060  $221,578,174   $98,008,088   $26,328,092   $23,483,010  12.07%  9.16%  -16.89%  10.08% 
SOURCE:   West Virginia State Auditor, Chief Inspector Division, Fiscal Years 1999-2006. 
 NOTE:   South Urban, Not Seasonally Adjusted CPI (1982-84 = 100) used to deflate FY2006 revenues. 
 
 
 TABLE 4: West Virginia Municipal Revenues by Population Size: FY2002 
  WV Cities  









Number of Municipalities  2 3 4239  2 2 0
Population (2000)  644,404 104,896 91,327 135,746 312,435
Per Capita Amounts (Dollars)   
Total Revenue  1,083.63 1,338.57 758.13 1,011.72 1,124.42
General Revenue  947.75 1,320.65 592.78 868.59 960.71
Intergovernmental Revenue  68.09 139.51 66.34 51.11 52.00
Federal Government  34.95 96.01 43.80 30.87 13.64
State Government  29.19 42.87 9.01 19.53 34.70
From Own Sources  879.66 1,181.14 526.44 817.48 908.70
Taxes  341.27 603.26 274.28 399.79 247.47
Property  95.57 124.09 58.36 122.80 85.04
Other  245.70 479.17 215.92 276.99 162.43
Charges and Miscellaneous  538.39 577.88 252.16 417.69 661.23
Utility and Liquor Store Revenue  114.25 --- 93.46 112.33 159.51
Employee Retirement Revenue  XXXX  X
SOURCE:   U.S. Census Bureau: 2002 Census of Governments.  
NOTE:  Current Charges include fees, assessments, and other reimbursements for services such as 
hospitals, sewerage, solid waste management and other services.  Miscellaneous general revenue 
includes interest earnings, special assessments, sale of property and all other general revenue. 
  Employee Retirement Revenue not calculated because of negative revenue. 
  Totals may not add up because of rounding. 





TABLE 5: West Virginia Municipal Revenues by Population Size: FY1997 











Number of Municipalities  232 2 3 10 217
Population (1996)  666,039 110,039 92,996 150,939 312,065
Per Capita Amounts (Dollars)   
Total Revenue  1,021.50 1,142.10 1,711.83 870.16 846.45
General Revenue  889.88 1,111.85 1,497.49 734.27 705.80
Intergovernmental Revenue  54.84 108.35 56.50 72.02 27.16
Federal Government  33.30 87.71 41.50 40.50 8.18
State Government  19.90 17.02 11.68 30.93 18.03
From Own Sources  835.04 1,003.50 1,441.00 662.25 678.64
Taxes  312.07 546.75 334.21 342.48 208.01
Property  87.89 136.61 88.96 87.04 70.81
Other  224.18 410.15 245.25 255.44 137.20
Charges and Miscellaneous  522.98 456.75 1,106.79 319.77 470.64
Utility and Liquor Store Revenue  103.92 --- 135.05 92.78 136.68
Employee Retirement Revenue  27.69 30.24 79.28 43.11 3.96
SOURCE:   U.S. Census Bureau: 1997 Census of Governments. 
NOTE:  Current charges include fees, assessments, and other reimbursements for services such as 
hospitals, sewerage, solid waste management and other services.  Miscellaneous general revenue 
includes interest earnings, special assessments, sale of property and all other general revenue. 
    Totals may not add up because of rounding. 30 
TABLE 6: Share of Total Municipal General Revenue Budgeted for Contingencies 
  FY1999  FY2000  FY2001  FY2002  FY2003  FY2004  FY2005  FY2006  Min*  Max*  Mean  Median  NonZ* 
Beckley  0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.77% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%  0.00% 0.77% 0.10%  0.00%  1 
Bluefield  0.00% 0.10% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%  0.00% 0.10% 0.01%  0.00%  1 
Charleston  0.39% 0.31% 0.39% 0.32% 0.36% 0.26% 0.57% 0.27%  0.26% 0.57% 0.36%  0.34%  8 
Clarksburg  0.67% 0.88% 1.39% 0.73% 0.78% 0.76% 1.56% 1.30%  0.67% 1.56% 1.01%  0.83%  8 
Fairmont  1.80% 0.85% 2.44% 0.79% 0.85% 0.08% 0.16% 0.12%  0.08% 2.44% 0.89%  0.82%  8 
Huntington  0.36% 0.60% 0.48% 0.34% 0.00% 0.00% 0.27% 0.00%  0.00% 0.60% 0.26%  0.30%  5 
Martinsburg  0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.80%  0.00% 0.80% 0.10%  0.00%  1 
Morgantown  3.00% 2.71% 2.84% 3.00% 1.56% 2.94% 1.13% 3.00%  1.13% 3.00% 2.52%  2.89%  8 
Moundsville  0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%  0.00% 0.00% 0.00%  0.00%  0 
Parkersburg  0.00% 0.00% 0.21% 0.23% 0.34% 0.56% 0.00% 0.47%  0.00% 0.56% 0.23%  0.22%  5 
St. Albans  0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%  0.00% 0.00% 0.00%  0.00%  0 
S.Charleston  0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%  0.00% 0.00% 0.00%  0.00%  0 
Vienna  2.43% 2.69% 2.35% 2.27% 2.15% 2.88% 2.88% 2.96%  2.15% 2.96% 2.58%  2.56%  8 
Weirton  0.19% 0.20% 0.56% 1.53% 2.54% 2.99% 2.95% 2.35%  0.19% 2.99% 1.66%  1.94%  8 
Wheeling  0.82% 0.67% 1.74% 0.76% 0.51% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%  0.00% 1.74% 0.56%  0.59%  5 
Mean  0.64% 0.60% 0.83% 0.71% 0.61% 0.70% 0.64% 0.75% 
Median  0.19% 0.20% 0.39% 0.34% 0.34% 0.00% 0.00% 0.12% 
Minimum  0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Maximum  3.00% 2.71% 2.84% 3.00% 2.54% 2.99% 2.95% 3.00% 
Non Zero  8 9 9  10 8 7 7 8 
 
SOURCE:    West Virginia State Auditor – Chief Inspector Division, Fiscal Years 1999-2006.  
NOTES:  “Min” stands for Minimum; “Max” stands for Maximum; “NonZ” stands for Non-Zero. 
 
 TABLE 7: Coefficients of Determination (R
2) for Contingency Line Item 
  Contingency & Budget Contingency & Population
FY1999  0.150 0.246
FY2006  0.012 0.027
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